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An intolerant sect has no right to complain when it is denied an equal liberty. … A person’s right to complain is limited to principles he acknowledges himself.
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The even larger difference between rich and poor makes the latter even worse off, and this violates the principle of mutual advantage.
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The suppression of liberty is always likely to be irrational.
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Inequalities are permissible when they maximize, or at least all contribute to, the long term expectations of the least fortunate group in society.
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Yet it seems extraordinary that the justice of increasing the expectations of the better placed by a billion dollars, say, should turn on whether the prospects of the least favored increase or decrease by a penny.
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The intolerant can be viewed as free-riders, as persons who seek the advantages of just institutions while not doing their share to uphold them.
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Indeed, it is tempting to suppose that it is self evident that things should be so arranged so as to lead to the most good.
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An intuitionist conception of justice is, one might say, but half a conception.
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It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper.
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The hazards of the generalized prisoner's dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the good.
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Ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think is most reasonable to enact.
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When the basic structure of society is publicly known to satisfy its principles for an extended period of time, those subject to these arrangements tend to develop a desire to act in accordance with these principles and to do their part in institutions which exemplify them
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The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
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That persons have opposing interests and seek to advance their own conception of the good is not at all the same thing as their being moved by envy and jealousy.
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Justice as fairness provides what we want.
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We must choose for others as we have reason to believe they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding rationally.
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We must not be enticed by mathematically attractive assumptions into pretending that the contingencies of men's social positions and the asymmetries of their situations somehow even out in the end. Rather we must choose our conception of justice fully recognizing that this is not and cannot be the case.
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This is a long book, not only in pages.
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A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitted together into one coherent view.
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Being happy involves both a certain achievement in action and a rational assurance about the outcome.
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Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the form of life of which animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in their case.
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Intuitionism is not constructive, perfectionism is unacceptable.
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A scheme is unjust when the higher expectations, one or more of them, are excessive. If these expectations were decreased, the situation of the less favored would be improved.
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Justice does not require that men must stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence.